

Winston Churchill: The Iron Curtain Speech

March 5, 1946

Westminster College, Fulton Missouri

The President has told you that it is his wish, as I am sure it is yours, that I should have full liberty to give my true and faithful counsel in these anxious and baffling times. I shall certainly avail myself of this freedom, and feel the more right to do so because any private ambitions I may have cherished in my younger days have been satisfied beyond my wildest dreams.

...Neither the sure prevention of war, nor the continuous rise of world organization will be gained without what I have called the fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples. This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and the Empire and the United States. This is no time for generalities, and I will venture to be precise. Fraternal association requires not only the growing friendship and mutual understanding between our two vast but kindred systems of society, but the continuance of the intimate relationship between our military advisers, leading to common study of potential dangers, the similarity of weapons and manuals of instructions, and to the interchange of officers and cadets at technical colleges. It should carry with it the continuance of the present facilities for mutual security by the joint use of all Naval and Air Force bases in the possession of either country all over the world. This would perhaps double the mobility of the American Navy and Air Force. It would greatly expand that of the British Empire Forces and it might well lead, if and as the world calms down, to important financial savings.

A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the Allied victory. Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organization intends to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive and proselytizing tendencies. I have a strong admiration and regard for the valiant Russian people and for my wartime comrade, Marshal Stalin. There is deep sympathy and goodwill in Britain – and I doubt not here also – towards the peoples of all the Russia's and a resolve to persevere through many differences and rebuffs in establishing lasting friendships. We understand the Russian need to be secure on her western frontiers by the removal of all possibility of German aggression...I am sure you would wish me to state the facts as I see them to you, to place before you certain facts...

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow. Athens alone – Greece with its immortal glories – is free to decide its future at an election under British, American and French observation. The Russian-dominated Polish Government has been encouraged to make enormous and wrongful inroads upon Germany, and mass expulsions of millions of Germans on a scale grievous and undreamed-of are now taking place. The Communist parties, which were very small in all these Eastern States of Europe, have been raised to pre-eminence and power far beyond their numbers and are seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian control. Police

governments are prevailing in nearly every case, and so far, except in Czechoslovakia, there is no true democracy. Turkey and Persia are both profoundly alarmed and disturbed at the claims which are being made upon them and at the pressure being exerted by the Moscow Government...

I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines...Our difficulties and dangers will not be removed by closing our eyes to them They will not be removed by mere waiting to see what happens; not will they be removed by a policy of appeasement...

From what I have seen of our Russian friends and Allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially military weakness. For that reason the old doctrine of a balance of power is unsound...


Last time I saw it all coming and cried aloud to my own fellow-countrymen...but no one paid any attention. Up till the year 1933 or even 1935, Germany might have been saved from the awful fate which has overtaken her and we might all have been spared the miseries Hitler let loose upon mankind. ...It [WW II] could have been prevented...without the firing of a single shot...but no one would listen and one by one we were all sucked into the awful whirlpool. We...must not let that happen again...

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1. Why does Winston Churchill feel that he can speak freely to the Westminster College audience?
2. Churchill mentions that his "...private ambitions...have been satisfied beyond my wildest dreams." What does he mean?
3. In the second paragraph, Churchill describes the benefits to both the British Commonwealth and the United States if they join together in a "fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples."
 - a. What did he mean by the term "British Commonwealth"?
 - b. What were the advantages of an Anglo-American "fraternal association"?
4. What is the "shadow" Churchill refers to in paragraph three?
5. Why is Russia's fear of German aggression valid?
6. Define the term "iron curtain"
7. List the countries that were behind Churchill's iron curtain.
8. According to Churchill what country was the only "true democracy" to be found in Eastern Europe?
9. What is the status of this country today?
10. In the fifth paragraph, the former prime minister states that the "difficulties and dangers will not be removed by...a policy of appeasement..." What did he mean by "appeasement?"



Explain the meaning of the cartoon above:



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In the boxes below, explain each cartoon.

DECLASSIFIED CIA MEMO

This document is an assassination list compiled by the CIA and Carlos Castillo Armas (code-named "Calligeris"), who overthrew Arbenz Guzman.

The names of the agency's intended victims were divided into two categories: persons to be disposed of through "Executive action" (i.e., killed) and those to be imprisoned or exiled (sent away) during the operation.

Before declassifying and releasing this document to the public, the CIA deleted every name.

TO: Chief, []
FROM: []
SUBJECT: Guatemalan Communist Personnel to be disposed of during Military Operations of Calligeris

1. Included herein is the list of Guatemalan Communist Personnel to be disposed of during military operations to be carried out by Calligeris.
 - a. Category I – persons to be disposed of through Executive action (attachment #1)
 - b. Category II – persons to be disposed of through imprisonment or exile (attachment #2)
2. This list is a revision, revised by Calligeris, of an original list prepared by Headquarters in February, 1952

Attachments: 2
Distribution: Orig. & 1, Headquarters

1. What does it say about the U.S. involvement in Guatemala?
2. What else was happening in 1954 that would have influenced the United States' decision to use covert methods in Guatemala?

The Eisenhower Doctrine (1957)

During the 1950s most of the newly independent nations in Africa and Asia refused to choose sides between the Soviet Union and the United States, preferring instead to remain neutral ("nonaligned"). In the view of Dulles and other policymakers, however, there could be no neutrality amid such an ideological conflict. Dulles often referred to such nonaligned status as "immoral." Concerns over the vulnerability of nonaligned nations in the Middle East to Communist subversion led Eisenhower and Congress to articulate a rationale for American intervention.

Resolved, That the President be and hereby is authorized to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East desiring such assistance in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

SEC. 2. The President is authorized to undertake, in the general area of the Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring such assistance. Furthermore, the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed force to assist any such nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism: Provided, That such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Constitution of the United States.

SEC. 3. The President is hereby authorized to use during the balance of the fiscal year 1957 for economic and military assistance under this joint resolution not to exceed \$200,000,000 from any appropriation now available for carrying out the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954. . . .

SEC. 4. The President should continue to furnish facilities and military assistance, within the provisions of applicable law and established policies, to the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East, with a view to maintaining the truce in that region.

SEC. 5. The President shall within the month of January and July of each year report to the Congress his action hereunder.

SEC. 6. This joint resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the nations in the general area of the Middle East are reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise except that it may be terminated earlier by a concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress.

1. Did the Eisenhower Doctrine place any limits on American assistance?
2. Did the resolution define "peace and security"?
3. The resolution focused on external threats posed by countries controlled by communism. What did this imply about the way policy makers viewed the spread of communism?